




الائتلاف الإسلامي العسكري لمحاربة الإرهاب
ISLAMIC MILITARY COUNTER TERRORISM COALITION

Book Review

2



The Future of ISIS: Regional and International Implications

EDITED BY FEISAL AL-ISTRABADI AND SUMIT GANGULY




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Monthly Book Review
Series of Terrorism Issues

The Future of ISIS: Regional and International Implications

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The Future of ISIS: Regional and International Implications

Edited by Sumit Ganguly and Feisal al-Istrabadi

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For many historical and academic studies, ISIS has been a subject of research that mainly focused on the past. This study, however, looks at the future. It raises questions concerning the short-term prospects of ISIS, what the international community can do to fight it, the way it will impact the Middle East and world order, its manipulations of intelligence failures and the means to prevent such failures, and the active local and regional groups in combatting ISIS.

The book offers what no other books offered about ISIS. It focuses on lessons learned and pitfalls that must be avoided in the future. It deals with ISIS as a strategic question for regional powers in addition to the U.S. and its regional allies. The book addresses policy makers and political analysts, and is written by world renowned experienced academicians and first-hand experts in the world.


State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS throughout this volume) seemed to rise dramatically in 2014, taking over Iraq's second-largest city, Mosul, in four hours. A frenzy of activity and hand-wringing ensued, both amongst the ranks of policymakers in various capitals and in the media. Indeed, no major observer of the region, in or out of government, had seen this rise coming, and U.S. officials, starting with the president, had been openly dismissive of ISIS while touting what they deemed to be their far more important success against al Qaeda. Yet here was ISIS achieving what al Qaeda had never even aspired to do in the course of its existence: taking over territory through military means from two governments that had previously controlled it. Overnight, ISIS erased the internationally recognized border between Iraq and Syria and pro- claimed the existence of its so-called caliphate and named its amir al-muminin—commander of the faithful—an Iraqi, Ibrahim Awad al-Badri, known by his nom de guerre, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi.

Despite ISIS's defeat in Iraq and Syria, the study says it is still very early to claim that we will see ISIS branches or affiliates in the near future.

Terrorist groups will surely continue to sprout and current groups will continue to change and evolve in formation in response to the changing global political scene. The study, expects that ISIS ideology will spread among regional groups, which will enhance its capabilities to shake regional stability in other regions around the world such as Afghanistan, Algeria, Egypt, Libya and Nigeria.

The study's anticipation of a rebirth of ISIS in a new shape and new regions called for an assertion of the U.S. strategy adopted in the aftermath of 9/11/ to prevent any future terror attacks and, most notably, uprooting any safe havens for terrorist such as Al-Qaeda's in Afghanistan before 2001. Since then, prevention of terrorist to reach safe havens in the Middle East has been a main goal for U.S. foreign policy. Despite American public contempt of Washington's deep involvement in the Middle East at the political, economic and military levels for more than half a century, U.S. direct involvement in this region will continue in foreseeable future to fight terrorism and prevent the rise of regional control.

ISIS had been building for years. Particularly in Iraq, as the Sunni insurgency was largely defeated—or at least reduced in size—in the wake of the surge of U.S. troops in 2007 and subsequently, what was then known as the



Islamic State in Iraq rose to displace al Qaeda. The organization that was to become ISIS began to grow and metastasize. ISIS's leadership initially sought refuge in Syria as the regime of Bashar al-Assad began to lose its iron-fisted control over much of the country, especially in parts of the predominantly Sunni areas. In the meantime, the Baghdad government, under the leadership of Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki, began to renege on promises made to Iraq's Sunni population that had been negotiated by General David Petraeus and Ambassador Ryan Crocker during the surge, promises to which Baghdad had agreed.

As the United States withdrew its forces from Iraq at the end of 2011, many in the Sunni community were seething with anger at Maliki, and a genuine sense of Sunni disenfranchisement began to take root. This sense of disenfranchisement became the vehicle of the initially slow infiltration of ISIS from across the Syrian frontier back into Iraq, especially in Anbar Governorate, as Maliki sent troops violently to disperse what had largely been peaceable demonstrations. It was this infiltration that set the groundwork for the dramatic rise of ISIS from Mosul southward in June 2014. By then, however, ISIS had controlled significant territory in Syria and had controlled Raqqa, its nominal capital, for two years. The surprise to the policymaking class in the United States and the region occasioned by the "sudden" rise of ISIS in 2014 seems to have been occasioned by yet another failure of imagination. Tensions in Iraq were sufficiently high by the beginning of 2013 that one of the authors of this introduction predicted the reignition of a civil war.

The book is divided into five parts, each consisting of two chapters. Part I, which includes this introduction, looks at ideologies and externalities. Part II examines intelligence failures and ponders whether the rise of ISIS in so spectacular a fashion, especially in Iraq in 2014, betokens an inability on the part of U.S. intelligence services to assess the real threat ISIS posed at a discrete moment in history. Part III examines issues relating to local actors, focusing especially on Syria and Afghanistan. Part IV assesses the often divergent agendas of the powers combating

ISIS in Syria and Iraq. Part V concludes with an examination of U.S. interests in the fight against ISIS.

The Rise of ISIS

In her study entitled, "Apocalypse Soon", Nukhet Sandal considers the vexed and elusive issue of ISIS's ideology and governance using the public theology framework, and resorts to epistemology to explain the group's attempts to return Islam to its past, shed light on constants and variables and what groups made a difference in understanding this new form of jihad and recreating traditional Salafi ideology.

Nukhet's study is divided into three parts. The first part deals with the basic questions of ISIS identity and whether it was a state, as it called itself, or just another terrorist group. The second part focuses on the theological aspects of the group's ideology and what it means when the group calls itself "Islamic" and how researchers identify religious identity. The third and last part focuses on regional issues in the governance of the group and war, what made it appear in Bilad Al Sham, not in southeast Asia or the south of the Sahara in Africa, and what regional factors formed the foundation for the rise of the group.

Nukhet rejects the idea that ISIS is just a terrorist group, and considers it as a revolutionary or emerging state, regardless of its destiny after the loss of the lands that one day were under its control. She sees that ISIS regarded itself as "an absolute political union for Muslims" and acted like a state to the extent of providing basic services such as health care and other public services.

Sandal dismisses the argument over whether ISIS is Islamic or un-Islamic. She notes that, analytically, it suffices to note that it acts in the name of religion—as other groups from other religions also do—and that it is able to rally followers and adherents. She argues that the issue of whether to place ISIS within or outside Islam should not be taken up by policymakers and politicians. Rather, she argues that it

should be left to theologians and scholars of Islam. She notes, however, the rise of ISIS as a phenomenon occurring in light of interventions in Islamic countries and the need, therefore, for policymakers to consider such second-order consequences when setting policy.

Nukhet Sandal wrote her study around the end of 2017 when Iraqi forces regained the last ISIS stronghold in the country, yet claims that it is still early to think that we will not see branches of ISIS or new forms of it in the near future, as such groups will surely continue to appear and modify their forms in response to the changing global political scene, which means this is a critical moment to prepare for what is next.

It is not easy to make future predictions of terrorist groups or fight their extremism and brutality without understanding their ideology. It is also impossible to sum up ISIS's aspects in one word only, because it is nothing like Al Qaeda or any other known terrorist group. How possible is it to build any meaningful argument about ISIS ideology if we do not have a precedent to compare with, when too many factors led to its birth and development?

Applying a theological approach to analyze ISIS is not about an identification of what is "Islamic" or "jihadist" in its ideology, but about figuring out how it ISIS employed its Islamic principle in its daily practices. ISIS leaders crafted a new interpretation of jihadism and Islamic governance, and molded traditional jihadist concepts within the specific political criteria of the region under their control and the period they existed in. this perspective includes all the religious, political, and regional factors which helped the rise of ISIS, which forms a useful perspective for analysts who are not Islamic studies researchers.

Sandal concludes by noting that a principal factor contributing to the rise of such organizations as ISIS and its fellow travelers is the lack of good governance in states where such groups do occur. To Sandal, it is axiomatic that promotion of good governance and building capacity should constitute an important part of the fight against such groups arising in the future.

The Failure of Intelligence

In his study entitled, "Why the Intelligence Community Failed to Anticipate the Rise of ISIS", Erik J. Dahl begins the consideration of intelligence failures and notes that some have argued that there were no intelligence failures in the lead-up to June 2014 (Mosul's capture by ISIS), and that these voices assert that warnings were given, but that senior Obama administration officials simply failed to heed them. Although there may be some truth to this line of argument, Dahl observes that senior intelligence officials have conceded that they did indeed underestimate ISIS's strength and its ability to challenge the post-2003 dispensation in Iraq. Dahl himself argues that the intelligence community (IC) did fail properly to assess the threat that ISIS constituted in 2014. Dahl traces the failures that culminated in the losses of territory in June 2014 back to February 2011, ten months before the United States withdrew its forces from Iraq. At that time the director of national intelligence publicly testified that, while al Qaeda in Iraq would continue to be a security problem, he believed it would be unable to control "territory from which to launch attacks." Others, most notably Defense Intelligence Agency Director Michael Flynn, did eventually warn of rising risks, but the warnings from other administration officials were general. The U.S. intelligence was not the only one who failed to appreciate the threat of ISIS. Less than a year before, no government or intelligence community in the most ISIS impacted countries could anticipate its strength, scope or speed of emergence.

Dahl argues that there were two principal failures. They are (1) that the United States lacked a physical presence in Iraq to assess adequately the virtue of the U.S. withdrawal, and (2) that what assets were present on the ground were focused on military operations and were simply unavailable to contribute to an understanding of the greater threat that was gathering.

The ultimate failure to predict the rise of ISIS is more than just another failure in a long list of American intelligence failures. According to Dahl, is a stark example of the new challenges facing

the American intelligence community today, which relate to the active non-governmental active agencies and other no-traditional threats.

From Pearl Harbor to ISIS

Part II concludes with James J. Wirtz's study entitled, "When Do You Give It a Name? Theoretical Observations about the ISIS Intelligence Failure". He points out that intelligence failure can take different forms and can be ascribed to many reasons, and usually refers to the absence of timely warnings against single attacks, or, in other words, when analysts fail to predict what could happen, where, when and why and eventually present their estimations to policymakers on time to make the proper decisions. For that, he calls it "intelligence failure".

Wirtz highlights the ingrained tension between intelligence analysts and policymakers when the analysts' efforts sabotage those of the policymakers and when, on the other hand, analysts inevitably should be able to provide policymakers with "actionable intelligence information".

Without comprehensive data, it is impossible to decisively determine how successful intelligence agencies are in their tough mission. Intelligence failure, not success, is what attracts most attention of scientists, practitioners, officials and the public alike. However, intelligence analysts act correctly sometimes. The night of Midway battle in 1942, marine intelligence analysts and officers estimated that Midway would be a Japanese assault target, and so the U.S. navy launched a destructive assault against a Japanese force near Midway. In October 1962, American intelligence analysts discovered that the Soviets have deployed ballistic missiles in Cuba, which gave JFK's administration sufficient signal to take proper action. These were remarkable moments of success for the intelligence.

On the contrary, public warnings against deteriorating situations which are not matched with anticipations are not enough to relieve analysts from the accusation of failure. In the

weeks before Pearl Harbor incident, for example, Roosevelt administration knew that American-Japanese relations have hit the bottom, and marine officers and intelligence analysts somehow anticipated a Japanese military action in the far east. They expressed their deep doubts about the deployment of the American navy in Pearl Harbor, a step they regarded as leaving their navy prone to threat. Likewise, in the days prior to 9/11, U.S. intelligence agencies sent strategic alerts to the White House of Al Qaeda's interests to hijack commercial airplanes and of its members' activities inside the country. Despite the "red" alerts in December 1941 and September 2001, the two incidents became synonymous to "intelligence failure" in the records of intelligence studies.

What exactly is meant by classifying the U.S. intelligence community reaction to the rise of ISIS in Iraq and Syria in early 2013 and 2014 as intelligence failure? The study assumes that what has been called intelligence failure with regards to ISIS bears a lot of resemblance to the events that led to Pearl Harbor and 9/11 attacks: on one side, intelligence reports gave accurate and timely alerts about the deteriorating security status inside Iraq, and on the other, the intelligence community failed to anticipate the political and military shock, the fall of Mosul in June 2014 and the collapse of the Iraqi army, which was a worrisome incident in particular when 1,500 ISIS fighters defeated an Iraqi military force made up of 30,000 individuals who had years of training and financial support by the U.S. in other words, the intelligence community could make some strategic alerts about the military deterioration in Iraq, but failed to give reasonable evaluation of the true nature of the emerging threat or the policymakers alerts about the way it will probably emerge.

Once the intelligence failure in the case of ISIS is discovered, it becomes possible to understand the challenges that the intelligence community faced to build an accurate and timely anticipation of ISIS and accurately reassess what it particularly failed to comprehend about its rise, such as its deviation from "Al Qaeda

example” of international terrorism, let alone the innate structural restrictions inside the American intelligence community which rendered ISIS a difficult target. ISIS is a unique terrorist threat. It captured land, declared statehood, used it as safe haven for its fighters, captured children in that land trained them in its ideology and war tactics and used social media and the internet for its recruitment purposes which made tracing it extremely difficult.

Writz concludes that the ultimate failure to anticipate ISIS could be structural to the extent that it became difficult to understand or anticipate “intangible incidents” such as the rise of social movements or regional instability, a matter which can reoccur in the future with similar factors, which makes intelligence failure to anticipate ISIS “harbinger of things to come.”

ISIS in the Regional Historical Context

Kevin W. Martin opens part III of the book with a study of local actor entitled, “ISIS and Other Actors in the Historical Context of Iraq and Syria” asserting that despite wide media interest in ISIS and the context in which it appeared and flourished, studying this phenomenon is especially difficult (for the social scientist and political decision maker) because of the fast development of events, complexity of multi-party conflict and its changing alliances and the scarcity of independently verifiable information. All that creates further difficulties to draw reliable conclusions and formulate proper responses. However, this did not stop researchers from examining considerable content of journalistic material, policy analyses and studies, and eventually, placing ISIS phenomenon in the proper historical context, identifying some issues that clarify past events, suggesting future development paths and providing lessons for observers from the region.

First: ISIS history, its intricate conflicts and its relations with other local actors reveal a multi-hierarchy in the Iraqi, Syrian and regional

history. In other words, ISIS and like-minded regional groups and the Iraqi and Syrian complex conflicts can be explained as outcomes of historic experiences and, as such, they cannot be successfully dealt with without reference to that history. In this overall historical context, ISIS and all other groups who are trying to topple existing regimes as well as all different people’s movements under the umbrella of the “Arab Spring” term, are aspects of deep, comprehensive and trans-generational discontent with the political system in the Middle East.

Second: Syria and Iraqi conflicts that led to the rise of ISIS have changed, probably permanently, the face of the region. Post WWII stability foundations that gave birth to the Middle East have been rocked. Despite the latest “victories” over ISIS and other violent groups, it is still unclear whether Iraq and Syria can be sovereign states within their current international borders.

Third: after years of being an outcast state, Iran rose as a major regional power with controlling position in Baghdad and somehow similar position in Damascus. Iran continues to gain importance in Turkey, Lebanon, Yemen, and the “Arabian Gulf”. Russian major support of the Assad regime forced a strategic reassessment in Ankara, Amman and other capitals.

Fourth: authoritarian governments returned to Iraq and Syria. The people of those two countries have been “mobilized” to the full; they have been terrorized and given bitter choices of exile, surrender, militarization, “extremism” or annihilation. Regardless of whether all responsible parties were motivated by principles of pragmatic or doctrinal purity, they have committed acts that can be regarded as war crimes or crimes against humanity such as the illegal demographic reengineering or manipulation of demographic patterns for political purposes which has been referred to by some researchers as the “great screening”.

ISIS in Khorasan

In his study entitled, “Islamic State-Khorasan Province, ISKP”, Dr. Amin Tarzi discusses the existence of ISIS in Pakistan and Afghanistan and its adoption of the historical and fictional name of Khorasan in forming the identity and relations with other groups, especially Taliban. He also reviews some aspects of the conflict between the two groups and how this conflict impacts the strategies and interests of local, regional and international governments in their war against ISKP in light of group’s announcement that ISKP stretches over central Asia, most of India and parts of Iran.

In Afghanistan and Pakistan, numerous discontent groups pledged allegiance to ISIS between 2013 and 2014, leading to the declaration of ISKP. Their discontent was prompted by personal injustices, religious conflicts and the temptations of ISIS success in Iraq and Syria then: ISKP succeeded in employing sympathizers in tribal areas in Pakistan and some Afghans and by 2015, ISKP started working in Afghanistan where Taliban felts dismayed.

Tarzi, who is the director of Middle Eastern studies at the Marine Corps University (MCU) in Quantico, Virginia, reflects the importance of understanding local factors that led to the rise of ISKP by discovering myths around Khorasan and the disturbed history of Afghanistan in the past four years where groups such as Al Qaeda, Taliban and ISKP are in struggle on the ground. Taliban refused to target Shia and so if Kabul government lost control of any region it already controls, Iran would consider Taliban the least threatening alternative.

Tarzi warns that while ISIS is losing lands in Iraq and Syria, its followers might resort to ISKP hideouts in Afghanistan. Here, most of the answers are in Pakistani hands to secure the void in the tribal areas where ISKP emerged. Improving relations between Kabul and Islamabad will also help marginalize ISKP.

International and Regional Responses

Part IV, entitled, “Joint Action: U.S. and Regional Powers”, deals with international behavior in response to ISIS. Dr. Hussein Banai starts this study by studying “international and regional responses”. In a matter of a few weeks, ISIS caused bog losses to Iraqi and Syrian armies, Syrian opposition groups, Kurdish Peshmerga and all religious and ethnic minorities from Mosul to the outskirts of Aleppo. The U.S.-led effort against ISIS in Syria and Iraq. He notes that the United States created a sixty-eight-member coalition to combat the group, though some prominent countries are excluded from this neocoalition of the (ostensibly) willing. Those excluded include Russia, China, Iran, and the Syrian government itself.

Banai identifies the five pillars of the coalition’s strategy as: military; stopping recruitment and flow of foreign fighters; cutting of funding sources to ISIS; humanitarian assistance and stabilizing liberated areas; and countering ISIS’s propaganda. He evaluates the coalition’s success in the areas as generally positive, though he says that attempts to stabilize newly liberated cities and towns have had mixed results.

Banai notes that a major weakness of the coalition is that many Sunni states regard ISIS as at base a check, however much of an unpleasant one, on Iran and its regional hegemonic aspirations. Similarly, Turkey has its own objectives in the fight against ISIS, particularly respecting Kurdish aspirations in the region. He places the blame for the rise of ISIS on regional state failure and “institutional ineptitude” and acknowledges that such endeavors cost billions of dollars, but counters that the failure to engage in them has resulted in great human costs also, including death and destruction throughout the region.

Faisal al-Istrabadi concludes Part IV with his study entitled, “Regional Constraints on the U.S. Confrontation of ISIS” that several factors have limited the ability of the United States to defeat ISIS, especially in Iraq. He argues that

one of those is the failure of the United States to articulate or intermediate a vision amongst Iraqis for what would constitute the post-ISIS dispensation. While it is self-evident that the all-Iraqi forces have been fighting against ISIS, there is no vision of what it is they have been fighting for. For over a decade, U.S. policy in Iraq was focused on supporting personalities instead of seeking to establish wise governance and an institutional government, which created the foundations for ISIS among the Sunni community as an alternative to the government in Baghdad.

Each of its major regional allies has its own interests, and many of them regard the fight against ISIS as secondary to other national interests. Thus the United States is allied with Iraq in the fight against ISIS there, but Iraq is allied with Iran both in Iraq (meaning the United States is de facto allied with Iran) and Syria. This morass of competing interests has made a coherent U.S. policy in either Iraq or Syria exceptionally difficult, and often impeded American efforts, according to Istrabadi. The U.S. fought ISIS through a loosely connected alliance where differentiated countries do not share a common strategic goal, and while some regional and international powers were seriously fighting ISIS to eliminate its terrorist threat, other countries in the alliance had different agenda.

Istrabadi concludes by stressing that in light of the absence of comprehensive political settlement in Iraq and Syria, it is highly possible to see new forms of ISIS in the future requiring American intervention.

Danger of Terrorist Havens on the U.S.

Part V, on U.S. interests, concludes this book. Risa Brooks begins her chapter entitled, "Territorial Havens and the Risk of Complex Terrorist Attacks in the United States" by noting that an overarching imperative of U.S. policy since the September 11 attacks has been to deny terrorist organizations sanctuary, like that of Al Qaeda in Afghanistan before 911/, from which they can plot attacks

on the United States, yet she warns against overestimating ISIS threat to wage "complex attacks" inside the U.S.

ISIS holding of territory in Iraq and Syria raised suspicions of ISIS-like groups' success to launch terrorist attacks inside the U.S. from safe havens outside. Soon, preventing ISIS from holding safe havens emerged as a justification of military action against it in Obama and Trump administrations.

Despite undermining ISIS control of territory in Iraq and Syria, numerous ISIS-like groups still have a grip over important regional areas in Asia, north Africa, the Middle East and beyond. Brooks argues that ISIS threat to launch attacks inside the U.S. is much less limited than what most believe because although land control enhances the group's capabilities, but it is not enough to allow it to launch any attacks from outside against the U.S.

Even though a regional safe haven, i.e. real control of land, gives the group numerous advantages and boosts its terrorist capabilities, the group's threat to wage attacks in the U.S. remains limited, and as long as ISIS is miles away, its threat is limited. This is why Americans should be cautious against overestimation of ISIS threat in the Middle East and north Africa.

Brooks concludes her analysis by pointing out that the threat of ISIS is "more qualified" than it is "sometimes characterized." Importantly, she says that her analysis has two policy implications. First, law enforcement agencies should be careful not to employ counterproductive strategies in dealing with local Muslim populations that have demonstrated their willingness to expose suspected extremists. Second, regarding U.S. policy in the Middle East, she suggests that the U.S. provision of air support to local militaries shows "promise," as distinct from maintaining a large U.S. footprint in the region.

The Three Faces of ISIS and How to Defeat Them?

Peter Krause ends the book with his study entitled, "A State, an Insurgency, and a Revolution: Understanding and Defeating the Three Faces of ISIS". The U.S. has always been politically, economically and militarily involved in the Middle East for more than half a century, and will continue to be in the foreseeable future due to its vital interests in the region named by Krause as prevention of regional dominance, prevention of nuclear proliferation, prevention of terrorist attacks inside the U.S., and securing access to oil and regional allies.

The good news, according to Krause, is that ISIS does not threaten the most crucial U.S. regional interests, namely the rise of a regional hegemon or the proliferation of nuclear weapons. The bad news is that it does constitute a threat to other U.S. interests, such as the stability of regional allies and the prevention of terrorist attacks. Moreover, the unique structure of the group makes it difficult for the U.S. and its allies to defeat ISIS completely because it is not a mere terrorist group, but an entity that one day ruled over a territory as large as the state of Indiana. It's a trans-regional mutiny that seeks to spread chaos and overthrow regimes all around the region. It is a revolutionary movement that works to restructure communities and spread extremist ideology. Failing to understand or combat any of those constituents means a long and disappointing future of tactical victories and strategic defeats for the U.S. as ISIS continues to use its affiliates

to create new offsprings. Despite banishing ISIS from the lands it dominated in Iraq and Syria is considered an important and necessary step towards defeating it, it is still the first step in a long journey. Luckily, the three faces of ISIS that enhance each other do actually weaken one another because linking the attraction of ISIS revolution and extremist ideology with its destiny sows the seeds of its complete defeat in its three faces.

Krause posits a strategy for defeating ISIS that begins with defeating the forces of sectarianism and polarization, despite the United States embrace of one side of the sectarian divide, rather than finding ways of bridging it. U.S. policy focused on military confrontation in its war on extremist Islamic groups in the Middle East. But the moment violence calmed down, U.S. troops returned home, which is seen by Krause as a major weakness. Krause calls, instead, for sustained diplomatic engagement by the U.S. to face the factors that led to the emergence of such groups as ISIS in the Middle East and other regions as a result of the fall of political systems in those countries.

The U.S. reliance mainly on military alternatives to combat ISIS and like groups means reinvigorating those groups. Preventing them from life oxygen requires U.S. direct involvement in creating a lifestyle among moderate political elites that steers away from extremism. Otherwise, the people in the region, including the U.S., will continue to suffer the same cycle of violence they have been suffering from for the past decade and half.

Contributors

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Peter Krause is associate professor of political science at Boston College and research affiliate with the MIT Security Studies Program. He is the author of *Rebel Power: Why National Movements Compete, Fight, and Win* (Cornell University Press, 2017) and coeditor of *Coercion: The Power to Hurt in International Politics* (Oxford University Press, 2018).

Kevin W. Martin is a member of the School of Historical Studies at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, New Jersey, and a senior fellow at the Center for the Study of the Middle East at Indiana University. His first book was *Syria's Democratic Years: Citizens, Experts, and Media in the 1950s* (Indiana University Press, 2015).

Nukhet Sandal is associate professor of political science at Ohio University and director of Global Studies at the Center for International Studies. Her latest book is *Religious Leaders and Conflict Transformation* (Cambridge University Press, 2017).

Amin Tarzi is director of Middle East Studies at the Marine Corps University and adjunct professor of practice (international relations) at University of Southern California's Dornsife, Washington, D.C. Program, and senior fellow, Program on the Middle East, at the Foreign Policy Research Institute.

James J. Wirtz is dean of the School of International Graduate Studies, Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. He is coeditor of *Intelligence: The Secret World of Spies* (Oxford, 2018). He was honored as a Distinguished Scholar in 2016 by the Intelligence Studies Section of the International Studies Association.





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