




الائتلاف العسكري الإسلامي لمحاربة الإرهاب  
ISLAMIC MILITARY COUNTER TERRORISM COALITION

# Book Review

# 4



## RETURNEES EXTREMISM IN PRISON FROM IDEOLOGICAL QUARANTINE TO REHABILITATION PROGRAMS

DR. MUHAMMAD AREF AL-AZMAT




# Book Review

Monthly Book Review  
Series of Terrorism Issues

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**DR. MUHAMMAD AREF AL-AZMAT**





RETURNEES

EXTREMISM IN PRISON FROM

IDEOLOGICAL QUARANTINE TO REHABILITATION PROGRAMS

Dr. Muhammad Aref Al-Azmat



In his book *The Returnees*, Dr. Mohammed Aref Al-Adhamat highlights a grey area that he believes has not yet received the necessary attention by the countries in their efforts and policies to counter extremism and terrorism, while at the same time drawing the attention of security authorities and other policymakers to another essential duty entrusted to them, which is related to the detainees held in prisons on charge of extremism and terrorism. Many still believe that the execution of prosecution and imprisonment of terrorists is the last episode of a series to put an end to the threat and risk brought about by such groups and individuals. However, the reality that security officials are most aware of is that the forgoing detention is only the beginning of a new episode in a new series of security risks and threats no less dangerous than their activities outside the prison walls.

The term returnees as defined by the author in his *The Returnees* means the young people who joined the battlefields in Syria and Iraq at the beginning of the current decade, whether they are fighters of the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) or from any other jihadi faction under any aliases. Simply put, they are returning home from the battlefields, not necessarily from Iraq and Syria directly, but there may be other jihadi stations on their way back home that we have no clue about.

To be more specific, the term returnees refers to the thousands of young people who decided to join the battlefields, leaving behind their parents, children and money after being lured by the appealing call of what they believe as a holy jihad. More so, they are those who suddenly decided to no longer assume their boring and minor role in their monotonous lives so as to make up another life for themselves in which only they can be hailed as heroes; they are those whose grinning and smirking faces would often crop up on Facebook, brandishing their guns with new nicknames, costumes and shapes, writing to their peers «come and join us», persuading them into being recruited into their groups.

The case of returning fighters is a widely known influx recognized historically by most of the world countries. Such an experience is not limited and confined to jihadists in that when fighting comes to an end, there are always returning fighters. However, the leading yet rhetorical question still remains: what is it that singles them out and makes them stand out as returning fighters to be further engaged in fighting again as believed by many?

There are many definitions of the term the returnees, but the definition that we are concerned with here is «they are those yet to be imprisoned». This glaringly brazen definition represents the bitter reality that must be

addressed. As such, the author introduces his *The Returnees* with leading and rhetorical questions:

Are prisons in the Arab and Muslim world ready to receive the returnees? Do people in charge of such prisons provide reform and rehabilitation programs that challenge the hardline and deeply ingrained ideologies they believe in? Do they have a clear and coherent policy on how best to deal with them throughout their detention? Do they have any guarantee that their ideology will not spread to the prison community and that the inmates in prison will not be lured and recruited? Will not such criminal inmates be recruited and used? Do the security decision-makers have a clear vision and are fully aware of the safe approaches to integrate them into society after being released from imprisonment while ensuring that they do not return and relapse into extremism?

In many cases, when special efforts are made to deal with such prisoners, then such an action is considered an instance of luxury or depletion of the government resources. Moreover, many believe that those causing intimidation and harm to people do not deserve to be well treated or even given special care by society; any efforts or attempts made to reform and rehabilitate them will be futile and in vain. People also believe that it is not unlikely that they will exploit such good treatment to reap some gains which they do not deserve, such as early, predated or premature release. Alas! This conviction was deeply ingrained not only in the minds of the naive citizens, but also leaked to the minds of security decision-makers who see it is of number-one and urgent priority to provide impregnable and high-security prisons that ensure their detention, surveillance and control, while any other actions remain unimportant!

In the discussions generated in his *The Returnees*, Al-Adhamat produces a body of telling evidence to prove that such understanding is erroneous and contrary to reality and has no ring to truth. The truth per se calls on us to read history while encouraging us to stand at the walls of prisons to deeply realize that behind such heavy and well locked doors much has been written about

hate speech and the publications of extremism and horrific violence were classified. Beyond the bars of the narrow windows were made the fatwas of exclusion and disbelief. Deep inside dingy cells and cramped dungeons were organized the most devastating conspiracies, yet doomed to be uncovered and foiled overnight, leaving conspirators in the lurch and behind bars! In prisons, criminal skills and experiences squared with obscurantist and destructive ideas and opinions, while growing in tandem across the outdoor area and yard time for exercise and recreation. Before the prison warden drives inmates to be confined in their cells in lockdown, such skills will have snowballed into a call for faith-driven jihad and legitimate go-ahead to kill others.

In his introduction, the author concludes that it is such an inescapable fact that «we cannot dictate the choice between quarantining extremists and terrorists or forcing them into reform and rehabilitation programs. We should be honest and true to ourselves; our statement should read something like: If we do nothing, they will». In more bold terms, «The years of imprisonment may be more favorable for their interest than for the government; if war on terrorism were a war of ideology, then prisons that do not give room to positive interventions are par excellence the generators of such ideologies. We are bound then by logic, historical precedents and our own understanding of the danger of such inmates to intervene. Even if we cannot reform or rehabilitate them, we can at least prevent their risk from spreading to other inmates», explained Al-Adhamat.

## Radicalism

Chapter One of *The Returnees* discusses radicalism. Research studies have revealed a poor consensus reached at by researchers and specialists to frame a clear concept of radicalism, in terms of the underlying reasons leading up to the adoption of certain forms of violence along with the nature of the correlation that relates it with terrorism.



The central and pivotal research question approached in these studies is always: Why do individuals join in with groups that adopt and espouse extremist ideas? When do they join in with such groups? How? Why are some of them engaged in violent acts that threaten the security of societies? How are they engaged?

In Chapter One, the author explains the concept of radicalism and provides discussions of the relevant definitions proposed by academics and political decision-makers. He further discusses the factors and causes contributory to radicalism at the individual and collective level. He also sheds fresh light on the levels of radical operations and their correlation to terrorist behavior. In spite of the existing difference between researchers and scholars, research studies conducted on radicalism are unanimous on the following facts:

- A clear correlation exists between radical and extremist ideas on the one hand, and the use of violence on the other. However, this does not necessarily mean that radical and extremist ideas are always translated into violence. Individuals and groups adopting

and espousing radical ideas can express their own thoughts without violence; while, at the same time engaging in violence may be felt far away from radical and extremist ideas. In other words, not every and each form of violence entails and begets radicalism and extremism. It is possible that groups loyal to and supportive of an existing political system or opposition groups and opponents may resort to violence without being deeply seated in such radical ideology.

- Radicalism is best understood by treating it as an extremely dynamic, multifaceted and multi-step phenomenon that occurs as a result of the interaction between an individual exposed to radicalism and a social environment that encourages the adoption of radical ideas.
- Three levels should not be overlooked when investigating and analyzing the factors driving and contributory to radicalism: the micro-level, which relates to the individuals themselves; the meso-level, which relates to social milieu and the group surrounding the individual; the macro-level, which relates to the larger community and political environment, surrounding the whole group.

### Causes and Roots of Radicalism

Chapter Two approaches the causes and roots of radicalism. It also provides reviews for a number of sociological theories that explain the transition from radicalism to violence and terrorism. Randy Borum (2011), a professor in the College of Behavioral and Community Sciences at the University of South Florida, concludes that this can be due to three basic factors: developing antipathy towards the target groups; finding a justification for violent acts; eliminating social and psychological barriers that prevent the use of violence.



#### DRIVING FACTORS CONTRIBUTORY TO THE TRANSITION FROM RADICALISM TO VIOLENCE



01 DEVELOPING ANTI-PATHY TOWARDS THE TARGET GROUPS;



02 FINDING A JUSTIFICATION FOR VIOLENT ACTS;



03 ELIMINATING BARRIERS THAT PREVENT THE USE OF VIOLENCE.

In the same vein, Chapter Two discusses a number of different explanatory models of the causative factors of radicalism and terrorism, drawing a line between three levels of analysis, as described by Alex Schmid (2013), a professor and Research Fellow at the International Center for Counter-Terrorism (ICCT), and Director of the Terrorism Research Initiative. Schmid is a Swiss-born Dutch scholar in terrorism studies and former Officer-in-Charge of the Terrorism Prevention Branch of the United Nations. For Schmid, there are three levels: micro-level, meso-level and macro-level as further explained here:

- Micro-level: it includes, for example, the problems of self-identity, failure to adapt to and integrate with society, a sense of isolation, suffering from discrimination, a sense of deprivation, humiliation, stigmatization, exclusion and rejection, which is usually associated with moral anger and an urge for revenge.
- Meso-level: It is the social milieu surrounding

the individual, and may be supporting or frustrating them, and serves as a point of contact or separation between the individual and the circle of radicals and terrorists, and then some radicals move from radicalism to violence and terrorism and into terrorist organizations.

- Macro-level: it includes, for example, the role of government and society internally and externally, the level of radicalism in public opinion and political parties, the pressures resulting from majority and minority relations, especially in diaspora communities, the role of the lack of social and economic opportunities that bring about radicalism, and public discontent that may turn and snowball into terrorist acts.
- Chapter Two draws a conclusion that terrorism cannot be rampant by one single cause, and there is no definite and measurable pathway in the transition from radicalism to terrorism. This holds true because there are many conceptual frameworks in the analysis of root causes and contributory factors to radicalism. However, despite this diversity, there is a consensus between academics on the need to analyze the root causes of terrorism and radicalism known as pulling factors and pushing factors (sometimes termed internal and external factors), and analyzing societal conditions that provoke and drum up for radicalism and terrorism. Reviewing theories posited for the



interpretation of radicalism and extremism, the author concludes with the following findings and results:

- The theoretical effort of western jurisprudence clearly believes that radicalism emerges through specific steps and does not crop up suddenly, but does not explicitly agree on the nature of these steps and their arrangement. Of note, they often include cognitive openness, isolationism, introversion, recruitment, justification of radical acts and the exchange of extremist views.
- Western jurisprudence distinguishes between the levels of radical analysis: the micro-level, meso-level, and macro-level. Radicalism does not reach violent behavior, and it remains in the radical stage of ideas without radical actions. It unanimously approves a set of influential factors at the three levels that will push an individual to radicalism, and then drive them to violence, without being an inevitable consequence; radicalism may not lead up to violent behavior and may remain in the radicalization of ideas without radical action.
- In general, western jurisprudence holds that the ideological factor is not the central factor or the driving force leading up to radicalism. Its impact is equally in parallel with other factors that cause radicalism. When the ideological factor is brought to focus, western

jurisprudence sees only jihadist salafism as an ideology adopted to justify radical behavior. It is glaringly obvious that deep western jurisprudence does not recognize this ideology or does not distinguish it from other ideological trends.

- Western jurisprudence unanimously agrees that the social milieu and the different relationships and ties have different impact on attracting the individual to the radical environment. Rather, the radical social milieu often has a central influence on the course of individuals running to the path of radicalism.
- Most of the main ideas of western theories that provide interpretation of Islamic radicalism go around the phenomenon in Muslim societies in Europe and the West. Therefore, such ideas are engineered towards the ordeal of personal identity, the suffering of discrimination and marginalization experienced by Western Muslims, and the inadaptability to western values and challenges of social and living conditions, as well as the issue of cultural differences.

### Radicalism and Prisons

Chapter Three discusses radicalism and prisons. The author calls for considering prisons to be something more than mere punishment and discipline. There should be a positive view that commonly makes the prison environment a source of inspiration for policy and decision

makers, counter-terrorism experts in security agencies and prison authorities. This also includes understanding such a group of citizens and the ideology that pushed them to violence, while enabling and empowering the prison system lest it should be a graveyard of extremist ideologies and not a nest to breed, by paying attention to the reform programs targeting such citizens and the conviction and belief in the feasibility of executing these programs.

Chapter Three aims to identify the impact of the prison environment on inmates vulnerable to radical and extremist ideas and beliefs. It also reviews many real examples of many who have relapsed into violence and terrorism because of the impact of prison environment. When speaking of the dimensions of the problem of radicalism and extremism in prisons, then history becomes notoriously rife with many instances of individuals, groups, ideological trends, literature, publications, research studies and stubborn fatwas behind prison bars, which is difficult to address in a holistic method in Chapter Three.

It has been proved that prisons make up a major component of extremism in ideological, organizational and logistical terms, and further provide a platform for extremist inmates to meet up each other and cooperate in tandem. Some of the most telling examples are the following. Camp Bucca, a detention facility maintained by the United States military from 2003 up to 2009, offered its inmates the opportunity to create relationships between different groups inside the

prison. Well, the very same prison, in which large numbers of jihadists and former Baathists were penned up in the period of armed insurgency in Iraq, made it efficiently possible to bring the two groups closer to cooperate and exchange experiences, ideas and ideology of combat and belligerency.

Ali Soufan, a former US FBI intelligence officer who pursued terrorist organizations for a long period of time, points out that the US administration decision to force the Iraqi Ba'ath Party to be dissolved along with the dissolution of the Iraqi army and the demobilization of its officers has pushed many Baathists into the arms of Al-Qaeda on the grounds that they have a common goal of protecting the Sunni people of Iraq. The Baathists provided extremists with organizational expertise, military skills, discipline and excellent training. Such a relationship developed and snowballed into the creation of the first army of the Islamic State (Daesh) in the same American detention facility center.

Although the prison administration successfully separated the inmates by sect in Iraq to avoid unrest and fight, it failed to separate the hardline Sunni inmates from the moderate Sunni inmates. Consequently, such an environment was favorable for extremism to breed and mushroom, especially since the administrators of the detention facility were not familiar with the Arabic language spoken by the inmates and detainees. Chapter Three also cites and draws many examples of how radical ideology was adopted in prisons and

how criminal skills overlapped with terrorism. It further explains that jihadist propaganda plays a noticeable impact on the prison criminals. The jihadist rhetoric meets the personal needs of criminals, satisfies their psychological urges; such jihadist rhetoric first persuades them to come to repent of their previous sins, then authorizes them to maintain their criminal behavior under a new slogan termed holy jihad!

The author emphasizes that jihadist groups deliberately target criminals as part of their recruitment focus strategy. Recent examples drawn from Europe have demonstrated a correlation between conversion to religion and radicalism and the criminal background of individuals. For instance, the background of the individuals who carried out the Paris 2015, Brussels 2016 and Barcelona 2017 attacks suggests that criminal life reinforces extremist networks and provides them with funding for crimes such as drug trafficking, burglary, forgery, and other illegal activities.

### Prisons and Ideological Quarantine

Chapter Four, Prisons and Ideological Quarantine, explains the conviction adopted by the policies of the prison authorities to tighten up on the custody controls and impose additional measures on the inmates charged with extremism and terrorism do not conflict with any reform or rehabilitation programs that can be applied to such inmates. Rather, prison authorities and security decision-

makers should aspire to achieve both results together. In the same vein, the author believes that the prison system for terrorists should well understand the inmates politically and ideologically charged and identify the underlying motives for their behavior in prisons, which may seek to mobilize supporters from outside the prison, or recruit followers and build command structures within prisons.

With the exception of some countries that have reached such a conclusion, most countries in the world adopt and chant Security First when dealing with such prison inmates, by separating them from the other prisoners, or isolating and segregating them in different prisons. In all cases, the priority is always to tighten up on the custody controls and implement strict security measures against them, with little attention to the implementation of reform and rehabilitation programs for them.

Furthermore, Chapter Four brings to discussion the regulations of prison for inmates charged with extremism and terrorism, along with the policies adopted by the prison authorities to prevent the spread of radicalism. It draws a close comparison between the different policies in this context to investigate the challenges posed by extremist and radical inmates on the countries. Despite the attempts to deny privacy to inmates of extremism and terrorism, the reality of criminal justice systems tells otherwise. Inmates sentenced or still remanded in custody under arrest and trial for terrorist crimes are different

from other inmates. They are interrogated by private security agencies different from those investigating criminal offenders and referred to the courts by law; such legislations and procedures are different from those enacted for criminal offenders.

Likewise, the law criminalizing their acts is different from the law criminalizing the actions of criminal offenders, and the court that decides their cases is often different from the criminal courts ruling criminal offenses. In addition, the nature of terrorist crimes targeting countries, political systems, or communities is entirely different from the nature of crimes committed by criminals.

The idea of denying the privacy of the inmates of terrorism is in a glaringly utter contradiction to the complex, stringent and rigorous measures taken by the prison authorities against such inmates; it prevents the prison authorities from developing an accurate understanding of the challenges posed by this category of prisoners, as they are no different from other prisoners. Consequently, the prison system designed for inmates of extremism and terrorism should heavily focus on understanding the nature of this category of inmates who are politically and ideologically mobilized and charged, just unlike other inmates.

In some sections into the end of Chapter Four, the author addresses the most important difficulties encountered by the prison authority while dealing

with inmates of extremism and terrorism. The foregoing category of inmates does not consider themselves as criminals; rather, it dogmatically believes that their presence in prison is an opportunity to pursue their strife, devoting themselves to turning the prison into a battlefield, so that they can support and advocate their cause.

### **Deradicalization**

Chapter Five, Deradicalization; i.e. eradication of radicalization, refers to programs aimed at rehabilitating those carried away into violent extremism and terrorism in preparation for their reintegration into society. To be more specific, this refers to the programs implemented in prisons and detention facility centers, targeting inmates of extremism and terrorism. A review of research studies conducted on deradicalization reveals that western jurisprudence agrees almost unanimously that there are several deradicalization processes and steps. Therefore, deradicalization efforts should include a positive intervention that provides content to take into account the circumstances of the extremist or terrorist, while treating them as someone who has strayed too far from the right path taken by the rest of society members and helping them to correct and redress their course of life. Hence, the extent to which deradicalization objectives and methods vary widely at the individual or group level, such as: blanket amnesty, counseling and guidance, reprogramming and rehabilitation, dialogue

and persuasion, cessation of ideological and psychological mobilization, disengagement from extremist and terrorist groups, rapprochement and reconciliation and reintegration into society.

Deradicalization has come into play as social engineering techniques in rehabilitation programs implemented in prisons, and has well focused on members of revolutionary militias who have broken and flouted the rules of law and committed crimes. The most compelling evidence of the success of deradicalization programs is the zero rate or low rate of individuals relapsing into terrorist activities after being released, known as recidivism. Deradicalization programs implemented in prisons can be a simple religious dialogue between inmates and religious counselors, such as the Australian Program implemented by the Islamic Council at Goulburn Correctional Center, New South Wales, Australia. Likewise, they can be religious programs implemented for short periods of time, such as the Two-Week Mauritanian Program. Other options include advanced programs such as the Saudi Two-Year Program. Of note, there are also programs that use former members of extremist and terrorist groups who have returned to the right path and abandoned such ideologs and practices, such as the Indonesian Program, which used former members of the Islamic Group. For example, former leader, Nasser Abbas, volunteered to interview and discuss the Islamic Group inmates in prisons. This action per se created a very positive impact on their

beliefs and behavioral actions, particularly with regard to targeting civilians. The objectives of national deradicalization programs are usually multi-purpose. Horgan and Bjørge (2009) provide a good summary of the objectives of national deradicalization programs:

- ▶ To reduce the number of terrorist activists;
- ▶ To reduce violence and associated victims;
- ▶ To reorient ideologically charged opinions and assess the behavior of those involved;
- ▶ To implement social rehabilitation programs for former members in preparation for their reintegration into society;
- ▶ To collect information and trace witnesses in court cases;
- ▶ To use former terrorists to promote opinions that renounce terrorism;
- ▶ To sow signs and voices of disagreement and dissent among terrorists;
- ▶ To make an exit for terrorism and clandestine life;
- ▶ To reduce reliance on repressive methods and tools in countering terrorism, while replacing them with humanitarian means and approaches;
- ▶ To reduce the economic and social costs incurred by long-term detention of large numbers of terrorists;
- ▶ To enhance the legitimacy of the governments and competent institutions.

## Objectives of National Deradicalization Programs



## National Deradicalization Programs

Chapter Six reviews national deradicalization programs. The author emphasizes that it is not easy to design deradicalization programs, mainly for two reasons. The first reason can be attributed to the potential of the government, including capabilities, capacities, criminal justice system, adopted punitive and disciplinary philosophy, counterterrorism policy, legislative challenges and constraints that may hinder many of the steps needed to make the program successful. The second reason is related to the nature of the special content of extremist and terrorist groups which the program deals with. The nature of extremist ideology, its ideological strength, its popularity and supporters among members

of the larger community have a profound and fundamental impact on the program ability to challenge and delegitimize its central ideas, especially if the socio-economic and living conditions of citizens, and the foreign and domestic policies of the country are not well met, accommodated and accepted by the citizens. This in turn increases the power of the opponents, including extremist groups.

Radicalization in the Middle East is further discussed, specifically the two Saudi and Yemeni programs to understand why the Saudi program has achieved great successes, while the Yemeni program has not! The author provides a quick review of the efforts of the US authorities to rehabilitate Iraqi detainees, while assessing the

appropriateness of deradicalization programs for the Iraqi situation. The efforts of the Egyptian and Libyan governments in applying collective deradicalization programs to Islamic jihadist organizations in prison are also discussed. To the end of Chapter Six, the author highlights the recent Moroccan experience to rehabilitate inmates of extremism and terrorism in prisons.

In addition, Chapter Six emphasizes that the Saudi counseling program is considered one of the most successful programs in the world; it provides extremists involved in the program with several options and brings to focus the history of good ancestors and cultural values, and benefits from the experiences of other countries in countering terrorism and armed insurrection. The program was founded on the assumption that the prison inmates cherish latent tendency towards goodwill and goodness, and that those involved in the program were deluded. The program is part of the government-based assistance provided to them because they deserve to be given a second chance to live in their communities peacefully. One of the advantages of the program is that the Saudi Government will benefit from the returning repentant extremists in terms of counseling hand in hand with religious scholars and preachers to legitimize their efforts.

The Saudi program is based on several components aimed at conveying and communicating a message to extremists that their behavior is not in the interest of and is unfavorable for Muslims. The Saudi Government

has successfully developed the program and it now includes the families of the detainees, separating the extremists from the rest of the inmates, while confining them to rehabilitation centers near their family residence to facilitate their support. This also includes the involvement of the families concerned in the program to immediately speed up their integration in the community. In the same context, it has been confirmed that there is a close and telling correlation between the treatment method they receive during the period of detention and how they engage in society after being released. Chapter Six also brings to discussion the programs implemented in Southeast Asia, such as Singapore, Malaysia, Indonesia and Thailand. The author provides a clear idea of the logic, philosophy and results of these programs, while focusing on the Indonesian experience in using repentant former terrorists, such as former leader of the Southeast Asian Islamic Group, Nasser Abbas, who contributed substantially to the success of the program. This also helped the Indonesian authorities in persuading prison inmates of extremism and terrorism to refrain from and steer clear of extremist ideologies, renounce violence and participate in the program.

### Anti-Radicalization

Chapter Seven brings to discussion anti-radicalization programs. Although the terms deradicalization and counter-radicalism refer to one meaning, which is to counter radicalization,



western jurisprudence draws a line between the two terms. According to Horgan (2008), deradicalization means the steps taken after perpetration. In other words, deradicalization refers to rehabilitation programs and projects that target individuals involved in radical activities and acts. The term anti-radicalism is used to refer to programs and projects that target individuals who espouse radical ideas prior to the commission of radical crimes and acts. The individuals involved in such programs may be radical ideologues, or individuals thought of to be potential candidates for radical ideology.

Consequently, programs and projects aimed at countering radicalization are carried out extensively outside the prisons for those who have not committed criminal acts; while, deradicalization programs and projects are carried out in prisons for those who have committed crimes.

Chapter Seven addresses anti-radicalization efforts as a concept independent of deradicalization programs, and reviews the most important international experiences in combating and countering radicalization, such as the British, Dutch, and Danish approaches, while emphasizing that the idea behind such efforts means that local communities and governments should maintain, uphold and safeguard their neighborhoods and suburbs away from violent extremism. The target communities should build their capacities in order to be more resilient to radicalism on the one hand and to prevent

terrorism from sneaking and cropping up on the other hand.

### New Practices

Chapter Eight presents a summary of the key elements produced by the good and positive experiences and practices that helped in the making of successful deradicalization programs while dealing with inmates of extremism and terrorism. Admittedly, it is widely recognized that such deradicalization programs along with the risk management of inmates of extremism and terrorism housed in prisons are highly specialized topics that are still under close scrutiny and meticulous discussion and more yet to be investigated.

The author gives voice to the success of deradicalization programs, which mainly depends on the essential components of the running deradicalization programs. Although there are a number of barriers to real and accurate evaluation of deradicalization programs, the least indication of the success of such programs is that the vast majority of those involved broke away and dissociated themselves from extremist organizations. It is no secret that the efforts made to promote the moderation of former extremists may be challenged with failure or weaknesses. However, the continued separation of former extremists from extremist organizations is a great success for such programs.

Rehabilitation efforts featuring an ideological

component that continues to exist after the program is completed - are characteristically down-to-earth and practically fruitful and are the most likely to be successful because they combat and counter all types of commitment to radical organizations and provide ongoing support to ensure that those involved in the program do not return or relapse to extremist ideologies. Of great note, the most effective programs take into account the psychosocial aspect and social dimension, provide necessary counseling to help the participant regain social support, and deal with real-life factors such as job-related training, creation of job opportunities and post-release care for those who once were inmates.







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