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Unprecedentedly, COVID-19 pandemic has disrupted almost everything and brought normal life to a virtual standsill, while the parallel social and economic adversities have brought favourable conditions conducve for dangerously divisive narratives to prosper. While violent extremists in Indonesia have attempted to feed on the upheaval, government security agencies adapted to the short-term obstacles more efficiently. Again, Civil Society Organisations (CSOs) and grassroots associations engaged with initiatives to prevent and counter violent extremism have also switched activities by distributing humanitarian aid and attempting to bring about programmes online.​

Maintaining enthusiasm and engagement by videoconferencing is uneasy; in-person meetings being inavilable will make the confidence-building initiatives fade away and more fragile during the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic. One pertinent lesson from COVID-19 pandemic is the importance of proactive and inclusive local leadership, which also applies to P/CVE policy. Recent developments indicate renewed enthusiasm from the Indonesian government to collaborate with civil society in prevention efforts. With the government moving forward to restore confidence through locally led initiatives, COVID-19 cautiously yet slowly crept into news headlines at the outset of 2020. In March, the World Health Organisation (WHO) declared a global pandemic, nations throughout the world were closing their borders, and life for many was suddenly unrecognisable as if shrouded in mystery.

Againsta a backdrop of global uncertainty and crippling pressure on government decision-makers, ideologues began to exploit new opportunities to undermine confidence in government authorities. Some sought to cleave social fault lines, while extremists threatened to renew terrorist violence. Addressing such developments was not easy for governments that were exhausted by the challenges of COVID-19 pandemic, although civil society activists made great efforts, but social distancing hindered their efforts.

The Report examines the impact of COVID-19 pandemic on counterterrorism and P/CVE in Indonesia. It has been noted that the Indonesian security agencies have adapted their operations well to such difficult conditions in perfect harmony with prevention measures. Important personal and community engagement programs have been put on hold and have been replaced by videoconferencing applications. Many activities have found limited success with a glimmer of hope to move forward. SCOs involved in countering violent extremism actively organize humanitarian assistance to individuals, allowing them to maintain contact and build goodwill.

Over the past ten years, Indonesia has developed strategies to counter terrorism and prevent violent extremism, but recent developments point to a remarkable and important efforts made by local authorities. Women have been disproportionately affected by COVID-19 pandemic. The majority of frontlne health workers are women. Given that increased numbers of women in Indonesia have become actively involved in jihadi militancy over the past five years, gender perspectives must now be a core feature of P/CVE programming, particularly through the pandemic recovery period.

The Report takes stock of the methods adopted by terrorist organizations and extremists in different parts of the world to advance their goals during the pandemic. It also considers the broad impact of the pandemic on counterterrorism programs, with a special attention attached to the activities of violent extremists in Indonesia at this point. The second section examines the adjustments made by stakeholders in counterterrorism and preventing violent extremism in Indonesia throughout the phases of the upheavals caused by the pandemic, and the associated limitations. This includes updates on law enforcement, criminal justice, and prison systems, modern and ongoing policy development, and community engagement efforts. The concluding discussion highlights the gain of the approaches adopted and provides constructive lessons at this challenging period.

The methodology is based on detailed consultative meetings with 25-30 stakeholders and civil society practitioners from ten organisations involved in P/CVE projects, as well as Indonesian government officials from the National Police, Directorate General of Corrections, Ministry of Religious Affairs, and the Witness and Victim Protection Agency. Equally important, consultative discussions were also held with national and international experts, including representatives of international organisations, such as WHO, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA) and the International Committee for the Red Cross (ICRC), using phone and video call platforms in 2020. The Report also draws upon secondary sources, such as media reports, policy papers, journal articles, websites and publicly available documents profiling legislation and regulation passed by the Indonesian government. The Report was also informed by the documents and resolutions of the United Nations, especially the United Nations Global Counter-Terrorism Strategy and the United Nations Secretary-General’s Action Plan to Prevent Violent Extremism.

COVID-19 pandemic created both favorable opportunities yet crippling obstacles for terrorist organizations and ideologues. Many attacks were staged, but the most important strategic development was the emergence of fresh narratives of recruitment propaganda and societal division. Against a backdrop of uncertainty, ISIS focused early attention on China, claiming that the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic was a punishment for the government’s treatment of the Muslim Uighur population. As such, narratives then shifted and developed along with COVID-19 pandemic, as ISIS claimed that COVID-19 pandemic was a manifestation of Allah painful torment with allegedly idolatrous and infidel nations being a primary target. white supremacists and far-right extremists injected misinformation and conspiracy theories into public debate and controversy. This included layng the blame at the door of several factors for the pandemic outbreak, from globalisation to religious groups alongside emerging technology infrastructure.

The Report finds that terrorists have seized the opportunity to carry out attacks either because the security services were distracted or because of the specific damage that an operation would do at this delicate point. In the United States, law enforcement agencies were concerned that Neo-Nazis were intentionally spreading a virus with bodily fluids. In this regard, one far-right extremist was shot dead while planning to bomb a hospital in Missouri, USA, and police in Germany and Spain arrested suspected ISIS militants before they could act, while lone-actor knife assaults and vehicle ramming attacks in the UK and France were also linked to ISIS-influenced terrorists.

However, it is still largely unclear how much developed direct operations have been due to the pandemic to incite disunity online. Radical agitators, provocateurs, and recruiters have exploited the uncertainty surrounding the pandemic, while benefiting from the lockdown imposed with the people confined to their homes. Some terrorist organizations have sought to exploit the economic difficulties associated with the pandemic to undermine confidence in national governments; many governments struggle to address the response demands. It stands to reason that when government institutions are reduced helpless to provide adequate social services, this creates a vacuum that non-state actors can fill, either by direct mobilization of assistance or by collecting charitable donations and distributing them according to an effective plan.

Militant groups have provided humanitarian assistance or healthcare services during COVID-19 pandemic; photos and videos by such militant radical groups distributing masks and hand sterilizers have drawn attention, but such incidents may be largely limited to opportunities to create propaganda content. It is certain that terrorist organizations themselves have not been spared the turmoil and health risks of COVID-19 pandemic, and many will face significant obstacles to their offline activities in the short term.

The Report shows that class and economic disparity may cause an increase in the impact of the pandemic among the less fortunate groups; it is expected to worsen in the wake of the epidemic because the factors that make people vulnerable to recruitment efforts are many, varied, and complex. However, it seems that the coming years will create a breeding ground for extremist ideologies to be spread and adopted, especially as trust in political leaders and government declines. Militants and violent extremists have sought to exploit the uprisings of 2020, but there is no convincing evidence that they have achieved practical success beyond propaganda and disinformation campaigns.

COVId-19 and Terrorism
The travel restrictions imposed due to COVID-19 pandemic have made life more difficult for terrorists; however, this has also induced human rights abuses, potentially exacerbating grievances. As national resources are depleted and diverted to respond to the pandemic around the world, observers fear that national security guarantees (including anti-terror activities) will dwindle, paving the way for extremists to take advantage of the situation. The armies and security sectors in many countries were tasked with ensuring public health and maintaining a safe social distance, which raised questions about the developed civil-military relations in some countries.

With the government resources globally depleted by COVID-19 pandemic, observers fear that national security guarantees (including counterterror activities) will dwindle, paving the way for extremists to capitalize on the vulnerable situation. The armies and security sectors in many countries were tasked with ensuring public health and maintaining a safe social distancing, which raised questions about the developed civil-military relations in some countries.

To enhance counterterrorism operations, quarantine measures for COVID-19 pandemic and checkpoints have come into play, providing unique opportunities in specific contexts for the security services to closely monitor and interrogate people, which may thwart plots in the short term. Travel restrictions imposed by COVID-19 pandemic have made life difficult for potential terrorists and further complicated, delayed or impeded their schemes. However, some are concerned that excessive coercive tactics, which in some cases have caused human rights violations, may exacerbate grievances associated with the root causes or drivers of terrorism. Thus, short-term security benefits may have very different long-term consequences. Some observers argue that the additional challenges faced by policing departments in different countries during COVID-19 pandemic may have imposed harsh methods and tools that can spoil the relations between police and citizens, and then weaken trust-based relations and channels of information sharing. With prisons adopting emergency measures to prevent infection or address outbreaks among prisoners, rehabilitation programs have often been suspended. Inasmuch as online extremism has become a cause for concern during COVID-19 pandemic, agencies and organizations have decided to increase counter-messaging campaigns because they are more conducive to work-from-home modality. Such initiatives are popular due to their relative ease, although schlars have noted their low impact. Finding meaningful methods to appeal to the same types of emotions that extremists prey upon with their propaganda is uneasy.

In addition to the temporary difficulties of lockdown and distancing, counterterrorism and PVE programs in various countries are at risk of budget cuts; resources are diverted to public health and pandemic control measures.

Following a survey of the pandemic involving (50) NGOs in concert with P/CVE program in (8) developing countries around the world, the Global Community Engagement and Resilience Fund (GCERF) suggested that donor organizations maintain community engagement by COVID-19 assistance, such as providing protective equipment and raising awareness of best public health practices. As recommended, donors must have started paying more attention, in the long term, to capacity-building among local actors to progress independently and sustainably, rather than simply implementing programs developed elsewhere. Most of such globally pressing issues also hold true when considering the situation of Indonesia.

Violent extremism has risen among affiliates of terrorist organizations in Indonesia online, while deadly attacks targeting law enforcement agencies have continued. This is largely related to the rise of ISIS, which injected enthusiasm into a disjointed movement and brought an even more exclusivist brand of violent extremism. One strange detail of this revitalized terrorism was the attraction of the eschatological theory or the end-of-time theory, which was a prominent aspect of ISIS narrative in Syria, when believers envisaged that an epic final battle would herald the apocalypse!

When COVID-19 pandmic broke out, many believers who went for this theory saw the end was imminent and chose to stay home and wait. As such, COVID-19 pandemic has had a mitigating effect on terrorist activity among some sections of ISIS-affiliated networks in Indonesia. While in-person involvement has declined, online activity has increased dramatically, and a notable feature in the early days of COVID-19 pandemic was the spread of accusations against China and Chinese people, ostensibly creating a type of agreement between ISIS-affiliated extremists and some hadliners in religious organizations; some of this referenced the Uighur population in China. Other posts focused on the Jokowi government’s perceived accommodation of Chinese business interests in Indonesia, particularly in the mining sector.

Conspiracy theories have proliferated on social media, with claims of a clandestine Chinese infiltration in Indonesia. During Ramadan, social media analysts in Indonesia observed a significant rise in the use of the word caliphate on major platforms, suh as Twitter and Instagram. However, there was no evidence that such a rise was motivated by lone-actor terrorist individuals or networks. The Indonesian government has been accused of mishandling the pandemic, and much talk is made of the caliphate system providing better healthcare, education, and public information than the government did.

Akin to far-right extremists elsewhere in the world, some have argued, without cogent evidence, that authoritarian governments have been addressing the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic with more relevance than democratically elected administrations. The Indonesian National Police has arrested several people for spreading lies, although reports indicate that civil society organizations have made a systematically important contribution to debunking lies as they arise. A telling example is a video showing a Chinese man sneaing into the country through East Java airport, but fact-checkers later discover that he was a visiting worker, protesting for fear of being sent back to China after his contract in Indonesia expired.

Another post in a Facebook group claimed that 19 Indonesian airports have been classified as secretive transit points for Chinese migrants since 2014. A video clip widely circulated in West Sumatra claimed that local residents set fire to Chinese mining assets, after an official reception for Chinese tourists during the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic in Wuhan.

Incidents During Pandemic
In August 2020, Indonesian police arrested 17 members of Jemaah Islamiyah for plotting to attack Chinese shopkeepers in West Java. The outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic caused the activity of the Mujahideen of Indonesia Timor MIT. This concerning development highlights the group’s resilience to the major setbacks it suffered, when the Indonesian police and army carried out a joint operation in which more than two thousand members participated to track down the founding leader of the group, nicknamed Santos.

In April 2020, the armed group launched a small spree of violence, with a police officer shot, two local farmers killed (one of whom was beheaded), and two armed men killed by police bullets. Observers and experts believe that this increase in activity was a direct result of COVID-19 pandemic, which the Massachusetts Institute of Technology considered an ally in the war on the enemies of Islam, as the pandemic killed non-believers and weakened the economies of the opponents of ISIS.

The report briefly talks about POSO, the small town described as the symbolic heart of ISIS support in Indonesia. Having suffered from past societal struggle that attracted ideological fighters from all over the country, the April attacks drew intense attention online. However, terrorist activity in Indonesia since the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic is not limited to POSO. In June 2020, ISIS supporters launched two separate attacks on police officers in Kalimantan and Central Java.

Consultations with security officials revealed persistent concern that terrorist actors linked to ISIS in Indonesia had already viewed the pandemic as a favorable opportunity to launch further attacks, believing that enemies had been weakened. It is reported that the terrorists discussed the possibility of weaponizing COVID-19 pandemic in some way, perhaps by infected children. Such threats are potentially unrealistic and impractical, but they at least demonstrate willingness to exploit the faborable circumstances of the pandemic to further launch terrorist targets.

The report considers that the Corona (Covid 19) pandemic has provided opportunities for financing terrorist organizations in Indonesia; Analysts have reported the contribution of organizations and charities to undermining the deradicalization and reintegration initiatives of convicted terrorists. In recent years, a large number of small organizations have emerged seeking to do similar work, some with alleged links to al-Qaeda or ISIS.

In the year 2020, some organizations modified their activities; To support some families and boarding schools affected by the epidemic, while this charitable endeavour may really help people in need, the custodians are working with goals that go against the goals of the state and civil society organizations active in preventing extremism through community participation.

COVID-19 pandemic has provided opportunities for financing terrorist organizations in Indonesia; analysts have reported the contribution of organizations and charities to undermining the deradicalization and reintegration initiatives of convicted terrorists. In recent years, several small organizations have emerged seeking to do similar activities, some with alleged links to Al-Qaeda or ISIS.

In the year 2020, some organizations changed their activities to support some families and boarding schools affected by the pandemic. While this charitable actvity may really help people in need, the custodians operate for goals that go against the goals of the government and civil society organizations in preventing extremism through community engagement.

Prolonged economic hardships may lead to increased desparaion and grievance, which is ultimately in the interest of terrorist targets. One of the most feasible and sustainable responses to terrorist activity associated with the pandemic is to increase investment in locally informed community initiatives that address the contextual drivers underlying violent extremism.

Vaccination and Disruption
Vaccines and violent extremism share a turbulent history. In the wake of the 2011-Operation in which Osama bin Laden was killed in Pakistan, claims surfaced that a fabricated vaccination programme was involved in the operation to confirm bin Laden’s location. Since late 2012, Pakistani militants have started targeting polio volunteers (many of them were local women), and clinics have been bombed or burned down.

In 2018, the Afghan government asked Muslim scholars to convince Taliban and ISIS fighters to allow polio vaccine units to operate freely, and local religious leaders in Indonesia could make a serious contribution to allaying fears and convincing people of the importance of the vaccine.

A spokesman for TTP, which has claimed responsibility for many of the incidents, stated they would stop if they were convinced that polio vaccines were Islamic and that spy agencies were not using such vaccines to kill their own fighters. Networks of violent extremism view the COVID-19 vaccination campaign as an opportunity to fuel unrest and discord. An attack on the vaccination team in Indonesia is not out of possibility, but it is likely that ISIS supporters will seek to exploit anti-vaccine narratives by online networks. Recent sentiments indicate that sowing the seeds of doubt will not be difficult; there were rumors on social media that infrared thermometer guns were causing widespread brain damage. A vaccine campaign will need clear information from trusted envoys in the target communities.

The conditions of COVID-19 pandemic required special measures in public health, but the pandemic did not prevent the Indonesian police from investigating and detaining suspected violent extremists. In July 2020, the Counter-Terrorism Unit announced that about 100 suspects had been arrested in the first six months of the year vis-à-vis less than 300 in the twelve months of 2019. A subsequent announcement stated that at least 70 terrorism suspects were arrested between June 1 and August 12, while regular operations resulted in more arrests until the last third of 2020. Still, it is not certain whether the slight decrease in numbers from 2019 is related to COVID-19 pandemic.

The Southeast Asia Counter-Terrorism Unit spared not time to develop own standard operating procedures for safe practice in the COVID-19 environment, which included measures to ensure officers protect themselves from suspected detainees, as well as other practices to mitigate the risk that their operations facilitate the spread of pandemic.

With the significantly increasing use of masks in public places, it has become difficult to follow and monitor individuals, especially new targets. One week before the government introduced the PSBB regulation on social restrictions in late March, the Indonesian Supreme Court issued a letter to lower courts encouraging them to introduce social distancing measures when needed, including work-from-home scenarios. The Ministry of Law and Human Rights, the Office of the Prosecutor-General, and the Supreme Court submitted a memorandum of understanding (MOU) on April 13, 2020, addressing the implementation of criminal trials through teleconferencing. The most notorious terrorist case at this stage was the case of two JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH leaders, who were sentenced via videoconference on July 20 for facilitating the travel of Indonesian nationals to Syria, where they trained or fought with Al-Qaeda- linked militia. 

Prison Management and Rehabilitation
By the end of March 2020, the competent authorities in Indonesia made a decision to allow prisoners who will have completed at least two-thirds of their sentence, i.e., by December 2020, to serve the next assimilation phase of their sentence at home. Approximately 50,000 inmates were eligible under the early probation scheme, which did not include violent extremist criminals.

To well address the public health needs of those who remained in their cells, as well as guard officers, the General Department of Corrections issued guidelines regarding sterilization operations and encouraged the cultivation of crops on prison lands to enhance food security. Training courses were organized by the National Counter-Terrorism Agency that target convicted terrorists before their release to de-radicalise those at the end of their sentences. such courses were initiated in early 2017 and accommodated four cohorts of prisoners convicted of terrorist crimes, who spend approximately 6 to 9 months before their release. The courses run by psychologists from the University of Indonesia seem to be a constructive feature of this initiative. The classes were discontinued in March but resumed in May via videoconferncing rooms. The lead expert states the work has been a resounding success.

In July 2020, the National Couneter-Terrorism Agency celebrated its tenth anniversary to be an executive agency; the agency has seen a change of leadership during the pandemic. On May 1, Commissioner-General Boy Rafli Amar became the Agency’s fifth leader, replacing Commissioner-General Suhardi Aluis, who held the first position since mid-2016.

After inauguration, Boy announced that President Jokowi had instructed him to continue developing the Agency’s deradicalization programs and to enhance coordination with both the government and civil society organizations. In early January 2021, the government passed a presidential regulation (Perpres 7/2021) related to the development of Indonesia’s national action plan to combat violent extremism. BNPT has launched many new prevention and coordination initiatives; Boy actively engaged with the media to identify priorities and developments. One promising new plan is the establishment of a knowledge center to collect information on all PVE-related activities taking place across the country.

Regulation and Strategic Communication
The divisive and subversive rhetoric that has surfaced on social media during COVID-19 pandemic has heightened concern about online attitudes in recent years. After a raft of updates to the national counter-terrorism legislation in June 2018, regulation was passed 18 months later that outlined the government approach to violent extremism. Government Regulation No. 77/2019 stipulates that counter-extremism initiatives must be implemented by relevant parties and coordinated by BNPT with the participation of regional governments.

The regulation also establishes that the priority of combating extremism is manifested in counter-communications (ideologies), (narratives) and (propaganda), through a range of media and personal events, with attention to religious and national values. In this context, a working group of religious scholars was established from the two largest Islamic organizations: NAHDLATUL ULAMA and MUHAMMADIYAH to counter extremist rhetoric and promote contents. Regulation 77/2019 states the intent to train and enable community cyber activists to work on such issues. Equally important, an initiative funded by the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), called Harmoni, is facilitating the work of small Indonesian NGOs, with unique ideas to promote social cohesion, such as reviving local art performances and hosting musical evenings.

Civil society organizations are involved in a range of PVE initiatives across Indonesia that involve mothers in rural communities and include probation officers who work with ex-offenders. Starting in late March, all face-to-face meetings were halted, and discussions moved to webcast platforms, such as Zoom, Skype, and Google Hangouts. A Jakarta-based participant said: It used to take a long time to organize meetings in the real world, but now we can quickly organize meetings together online, which is great.

However, the facilitation benefits come with some caveats. practitioners described the difficulty of maintaining online engagement with former prisoners convicted of terrorism offences, who are now reintegrating back into their communities. It is difficult to develop enthusiasm with online awareness meetings.

Indonesia ranks first in the world in philanthropy and volunteerism, and the pandemic has seen crowdfunding campaigns to support workers in the informal economy across the country. Women have been impacted, as they comprise the majority of frontline healthcare workers and have assumed additional responsibilities and burdens in the home. Women are also at the forefront of humanitarian volunteerism and have made a significant contribution to strengthening social cohesion and combating subversive disinformation and online deception.

Important developments among Islamist extremists in Indonesia were also observd since the emergence of ISIS, including the increased involvement of women in all aspects of the movement, from recruitment to launching attacks, while women are still underrepresented in official counter-terrorism circles.

Victims and Survivors​
COVID-19 pandemic and the associated economic pressures have had a deeper and more severe impact on vulnerable groups in society, including victims and survivors of terrorist violence in Indonesia. Updates to the national counter-terrorism legislation in June 2018 mapped out the government intention to provide compensation and emotional support to victims of violent extremism, but a subsequent executive regulation was needed to clarify the procedures.

This came during the pandemic in July 2020, in the form of regulation (Perturan Pemerintah) No. 35/2020, signed by President Jokowi after a meeting with the stakeholders. The regulation allows for retroactive compensation claims for terrorist events since 2002, a period of time that includes the devastating bombing attacks in Bali, which claimed the lives of about two hundred people and injured more than two hundred others. The Witness and Victim Protection Agency is mandated with supervising and facilitating the implementation processes, which are detailed in the regulation. In addition to compensation, victims of terrorism will receive medical and mental support. Over the past years, victims of violent extremism in Indonesia have proactively engaged in initiatives to either keep people away from terrorist networks or to prevent them from joining in the first place.

The response to COVID-19 pandemic has made clear the importance of coordination between central, regional, and local authorities. Indonesian civil society organizations working on PVE initiatives are seeking to cooperate closely with local government departments to direct support where most needed. As such, goodwill and trust relationships have been strengthened, which will be valuable in the face of existing and poetnial challenges, but there are still obstacles to coordination and cooperation.

Some of the civil society organizations interviewed for this report indicated that when they reach out to regional government officials (particularly lower levels of government) with plans in hand to implement CVE, concerns are sometimes raised that current regulatory frameworks are insufficient to allow local action. Regional officials often view counterterrorism, and even softer prevention or mitigation efforts, as the sole purview of the capital’s national security agencies.

Unremitting and concerted efforts in Indonesia decimated a new wave of violent extremism which had been revitalized by ISIS rise in the Middle East. The Indonesian security services have worked out resourceful methods to continue their work during the outbreak of COVID-19 pandemic. The development of special standard operating procedures and safety guidelines has enabled such vital agencies to maintain their essential functions, while observing the restrictions of social distancing and related health precautions. Police continued to detain terrorism suspects, and courts successfully prosecuted individuals accused of related crimes. Criminal trial proceedings were conducted by videoconferncing, and two JEMAAH ISLAMIYAH leaders were sentenced on charges of facilitating the travel of Indonesian nationals to Syria, where they trained or fought with Al-Qaeda-linked militia.

Face-to-face engagement initiatives that seek to prevent involvement in violent extremism or recidivism have encountered various obstacles but attempts to bring some of such efforts online must be maintained when the world returns to normality. The widespread use of videoconferencing for rehabilitation classes at the Sentul De-Radicalization facility is a good example. However, videoconferencing has drawbacks. The technology and infrastructure needed are still too widespread to reach out to everyone. In a country twice the size of Europe and with several thousand islands, the use of applications, such as Zoom, at least among those with the means, could benefit organizational cooperation in several areas.

Individuals tend to be pushed or pulled toward violent extremism for various reasons, including unstable structural conditions, diminishing social and economic opportunities, and increasing inequality. Taken together, these create a breeding ground for extremist narratives to prosper. An exclusionary boom that leaves segments of the population behind will create a foothold for such extremist narratives to grow. An inclusive and human-centered recovery that leaves no one lagging behind will erode the environmental conditions that allow extremist narratives to gain popular acceptance.

The flow of humanitarian aid and community support across Indonesia during the pandemic symbolizes the national resilience; it well suggests that this globally common enemy may have brought people together. The pandemic seems to have prompted people everywhere to reassess what is important in their lives. While a small minority may end up following hate-inspired pathways toward subversive activity, it is tempting to be optimistic about the emergence of stronger, closer, and more cohesive communities. The human security approach to preventing violent extremism can build on this sentiment, which ensures a participatory process that starts from the ground up, in which communities actively participate in identifying their problems and developing feasible solutions.​
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Issue 33
A monthly publication that provides a review of international reports on terrorism
1/3/2022 12:39 PM